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State Unitary Tax: The "Risk" of

Container Corp. of America v.
Franchise Tax Board
By VALERIE E. COLLANTON
Member of the Class of 1986

I.

INTRODUCTION

The constitutionality of a state scheme to tax the income of multijurisdictional corporations by an apportionment method ' has been disputed for some time.2 Although urged to do so, the United States
Supreme Court has refused to hold that states must use the separate accounting, or so-called arm's length, method3 when assessing the tax lia1. An apportionment formula is basically a ratio as illustrated below:
Total property within
total sales within
total payroll within
the taxing state
+ the taxing state + the taxing state
Total property
worldwide

total sales
worldwide

total payroll worldwide

= X
Y

X
y (multiplied by) taxpayer's net income = income attributable to the taxing state.
See infra note 18 and accompanying text. See also Note, State Taxation of MultinationalCorporations and the Apportionment of Worldwide Income, 63 NEB. L. REv. 631 (1984). See
generally Mobil Oil Corp. v. Commissioner of Taxes, 445 U.S. 425, 429 (1980); J. HELLERSTEIN, STATE TAXATION: CORPORATE INCOME AND FRANCHISE TAx (1983).

2. See, e.g., Underwood Typewriter Co. v. Chamberlain, 254 U.S. 113 (1920) (where a
Delaware corporation, which did all of its manufacturing in Connecticut, challenged the constitutionality of a Connecticut apportionment formula that attributed 47% of its net profits to
that state, although less than 4% were actually received there. Because Underwood failed to
show that the Connecticut scheme was inherently arbitrary or produced an unreasonable result, the Court refused to declare it per se unconstitutional). See generally Container Corp. of
America v. Franchise Tax Board, 463 U.S. 159 (1983) (challenging the inclusion of foreign
source income within an apportionment scheme); Mobil Oil Corp. v. Commissioner of Taxes,
445 U.S. 425 (1980) (challenging the inclusion of dividend income within an apportionment
formula); Japan Line, Ltd. v. County of Los Angeles, 441 U.S. 434 (1979) (challenging the use
of an ad valorem property tax on the instrumentalities of foreign commerce); Moorman Mfg.
Co. v. Bair, 437 U.S. 267 (1978) (challenging the use of a single factor apportionment
formula).
3. As contrasted to an apportionment method, the separate accounting method treats
each component of a multijurisdictional entity as separate for tax purposes. Thus, geographical location is the measure used for determining the taxpayer's tax base. The state makes its
determination based upon the income received by the entity within the state, as reflected on the
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bility of a business whose income is, at least in part, attributable to the
state. 4
Instead, the Court has determined that the Constitution does not
require a state to utilize a particular method when determining the tax
base of a corporate entity.5 The Court has emphasized that it is not the
chosen method of taxation which per se invokes constitutional scrutiny,
but rather the application of that method to a particular taxpayer which
raises the issue.6 Therefore, the Court has held that once due process
and commerce clause requirements have been met, it will not strike down
an apportionment scheme.7 These requirements are inextricably linked
to the unitary business concept.8
While this position may be acceptable in the case of a domestic parent corporation with domestic subsidiaries and affiliates, 9 it has been
urged that the Court adopt a different approach where foreign source
income is swept into the unitary scheme."° This position is premised on
the theory that, in accord with international practice,"1 the federal government should treat foreign-owned enterprises as separate entities for
tax purposes, thus employing the arm's length method. Because the state
apportionment scheme does not conform to the international standard, it
has been argued that foreign countries fearful of or subjected to the possibility of double taxation may cease investing in the United States, or impose a retaliatory tax on United States enterprises operating abroad, or
do both. 2
In JapanLine, Ltd. v. County of Los Angeles, 13 the Court recognized
books of the business. Of course, any reallocation to reflect transactions between related entities is made in accordance with separate accounting principles. Note, supra note 1, at 632 n.4.

See, e.g., 26 U.S.C. § 482 (1982). See generally J. HELLERSTEIN, supra note 1.
4. Mobil Oil Corp. v. Commissioner of Taxes, 445 U.S. 425, 438 (1980).
5. See Moorman Mfg. Co. v. Bair, 437 U.S. 267, 287 (1978) (holding that, absent congressional legislation to the contrary, the Constitution does not require a state to apply a three-

factor apportionment formula as opposed to a single-factor formula).
6. Id. at 274.
7. See id.

8. If intrastate and out-of-state activities constitute a single business (even though carried
on through separate entities), the use of the apportionment method will not result in a per se
constitutional violation. Thus, if a business is categorized as unitary, its out-of-state income
has a definite relation to the taxing state and may properly be included within the apportion-

ment formula. Mobil Oil Corp. v. Commissioner of Taxes, 445 U.S. 425, 438 (1980).
9. See Japan Line, Ltd. v. County of Los Angeles, 441 U.S. 434, 447 (1979).
10. See STATE TAXATION OF MULTINATIONAL CORPORATIONS: ADVISORY COMMISSION ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS 1-3 (April 1983) [hereinafter cited as ADVISORY
COMMISSION].

11. Id. at 3.
12. Id. at 1-23.
13. 441 U.S. 434 (1979).
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that foreign commerce does involve different policy considerations, necessitating a more extensive constitutional inquiry.1 4 Utilizing this approach the Court applied a closer scrutiny standard and struck down
California's ad valorem property tax as applied to cargo containers
owned by a Japanese shipping company and used exclusively in foreign
commerce. The containers were owned, based, and registered in Japan,
and were subject to a full value tax by that nation.15
Although JapanLine appeared to be the "different approach" urged
by those opposed to the apportionment method, "closer scrutiny" will
not necessarily result in a constitutional bar in every situation implicating foreign commerce. This became apparent in Container Corp. of
America v. FranchiseTax Board, 6 in which a domestic corporation with
foreign subsidiaries challenged the application of California's three-factor
apportionment formula to the corporation's worldwide income. Relying
on Japan Line, Container Corporation claimed that the apportionment
method was simply inappropriate in a foreign commerce situation. 7 The
Court acknowledged that, in accordance with Japan Line principles,
closer scrutiny was required in the international setting. The Court also
made it clear that, at least in situations involving a domestic parent corporation with foreign affiliates, the higher standard imposed by that test
is met, and use of an apportionment method would not be struck down
18
absent federal legislation to the contrary.
The Court in Container Corp. emphasized the lack of any congressional action as an indication that a contrary result was warranted.' 9
Thus the following question is left open by Container Corp.: Given the
continued lack of congressional action, would the same result be mandated in the case of a foreign parent corporation with domestic affiliates,
or are there more compelling reasons requiring the Court to strike down
the use of an apportionment formula in that situation?
After analyzing the constitutional challenges that have been advanced and the solutions provided by the United States Supreme Court,
this Note will discuss the foreign parent issue in light of both the Japan
Line and Container Corp. decisions. It will also examine the problems
the Court will face in attempting to devise a solution and, additionally,
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.

Id. at 448.
Id.
463 U.S. 159 (1983).
Id.
Id. at 180-84.
Id. at 184-85.
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will consider the question of whether congressional action should dictate
a state's taxation scheme when foreign commerce is involved.
II.

CONSTITUTIONAL CHALLENGES IN THE
DOMESTIC SPHERE

When a taxpayer's business activities transcend state lines, as when
an enterprise does its manufacturing in one state and conducts its sales
operations in another, an apportionment method may be utilized to determine what percentage of its income is attributable to the taxing state.
The most commonly employed formula takes into account three factors:
property, payroll, and sales. A ratio is determined by dividing the
amount of each factor located within the state by the total amount worldwide. This ratio is then multiplied by the taxpayer's net income, usually
taken from its federal tax return. The result is the percentage of income
deemed attributable to the taxing jurisdiction. 20 Thus, the apportionment method requires in its formula the use of income earned outside the
borders of the taxing jurisdiction. As a result, the apportioning of income earned by multijurisdictional corporations has been subject to two
constitutional challenges: (1) that the method violates the due process
clause of the fourteenth amendment and (2) that it places an impermissible burden on interstate commerce.
A.

The Due Process Challenge

Due process mandates that a state's taxing power end at its borders. 21 Thus it can be argued that the inclusion of any income earned
from without the state results in the taxation of extraterritorial values.2 2
The United States Supreme Court, however, has rejected the notion that
an apportionment formula must be struck down merely because it may
include income whose identifiable source is outside the taxing jurisdiction. 23 The Court has recognized that the complexity of modern business
transactions does not always lend itself to the neat isolation of income
sources. 24 Given this fact, a two-prong test has been fashioned to determine whether due process requirements have been met by a state seeking
to include outside income within its tax assessment.2 5
The first prong of the test requires a "minimal connection" between
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.

See supra note 1.
See generally supra note 2.
Moorman Mfg. Co. v. Bair, 437 U.S. 267, 271-72 (1978).
Id.
See Mobil Oil Corp. v. Commissioner of Taxes, 445 U.S. 425, 438 (1980).
Moorman Mfg. Co. v. Bair, 437 U.S. 267, 271-72 (1978).
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the taxing state and the taxpayer's interstate activities. 26 This connection, created when a corporation carries on business within the taxing
state, 27 runs through all transactions related to that business. The fact
that these transactions may extend beyond the state's borders does not
sever the constitutionally required connection.2 8
Under this analysis, the Court has concluded that "the linchpin of
apportionability in the field of state income taxation is the unitary-business principle."2 9 Standing alone, an out-of-state subsidiary, affiliate, or
parent corporation would not satisfy the "minimal connection" requirement because it is not carrying on business within the taxing jurisdiction.
Any of its earned income would thus be beyond that jurisdiction's power
to tax. However, once the enterprise is treated as unitary, that is as a
single business, then all transactions by the components of that enterprise
become connected to the taxing state, and the income earned from those
transactions may properly be included in the apportionment formula.
This does not mean, however, that the entire net profits of a unitary
business can be taxed by one jurisdiction. Rather, the Court is merely
acknowledging that a state may properly allocate to itself those profits
which, although earned outside its borders, are attributable to the corporation's activities within the state.3 ° In fact, the theory of apportionment
operates on the premise that the method, if applied by all involved jurisdictions, could not result in taxation of more that 100% of the net profits.
Once an interstate business is found to be unitary, the first prong of
the due process test is satisfied. If, however, the taxpayer could prove
that the out-of-state income was earned through an activity unrelated to
the intrastate business, the Court has conceded that this would at least
"raise the question of nonapportionability."3 1
Once a "minimal connection" is established, the second prong requires fair apportionment. That is, "the income attributed to the State
for tax purposes must be rationally related to 'values connected with the
taxing State.' "32 Here a problem arises because the apportionment
method provides only an estimate of the amount of income generated
within the state. Thus, its imprecision in its attribution of income has
given rise to the argument that, as an income division method, it can
26. Mobil Oil Corp. v. Commissioner of Taxes, 445 U.S. 425, 436-37 (1980).

27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 439.
See Hans Rees & Sons v. North Carolina, 283 U.S. 123, 134 (1931).
Mobil Oil Corp. v. Commissioner of Taxes, 445 U.S. 425, 442 (1980).
Moorman Mfg. Co. v. Bair, 437 U.S. 267, 273 (1978) (citations omitted).
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never satisfy due process. 33 The Court instead has decided that imprecision is not an impediment to the satisfaction of due process requirements.
Rather, the Court has been emphatic in its determination that a rational
relationship does not require precision. 4 Due process requirements are
thus met when the divisive method results in an attribution of income
reasonably related to the corporation's intrastate activities.35
Although the Court will not find an apportionment statute invalid
on its face, the method may still be susceptible to challenge under the due
process clause. The apportionment method is an estimation of the
amount of income attributable to the state. The Court concedes that its
application will sometimes result in an over- or under-estimation of a
state's proportionate share.3 6 A corporate taxpayer may succeed in the
invalidation of the method if it can show that, as applied to the taxpayer,
the formula overestimates to the point of producing an unreasonable result.37 This, however, is not an easy burden to meet. The Court has
made it clear that a due process violation will not be found unless "the
taxpayer has proved by 'clear and cogent' evidence that the income attributed to the state is in fact 'out of all appropriate proportions to the
business transacted . . . in that state,' or has led to a grossly distorted
38
result."
What exactly qualifies as "out of all appropriate proportions" or a
"grossly distorted result" has never been definitively stated. In only one
39
case to date, Hans Rees & Sons v. North Carolina,
has the Court determined that a taxpayer met its burden of proving an unreasonable result.
In that case, the application of an apportionment formula resulted in a
tax on eighty-three percent of the taxpayer's income when in fact only
seventeen percent was attributable to the taxing state." Although the
Court has never actually stated how much is too much, it seems absurd
to assume that a distortion as gross as the one presented in Hans Rees
must be shown before a court will find that due process has been
violated.4
33.
34.
35.
36.

See id.
See id.
Id.
Id.

37. Id.at 274.
38. Id.
39. 283 U.S. 123 (1931).
40. Id at 127-28.
41. The heavy burden placed on the taxpayer is also demonstrated by the standard of
proof enunciated by the Court--clear and cogent evidence as opposed to a preponderance.
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The Commerce Clause

The second constitutional challenge has been made under the commerce clause. Opponents of the apportionment method claim that it
places an impermissible burden on interstate commerce and therefore
must be declared void.42
Although recognizing the desirability of "free trade," the Court has
made it clear that interstate commerce must pay its own way and that
requiring interstate commerce to be responsible for its fair share of state
taxes does not impose an impermissible burden.4 3 Of course, not every
state tax assessment may be representative of an interstate business' fair
share. To make that determination, however, the language of a state's
taxation statute is not dispositive; rather, the practical effect of the statute's application controls.' Thus the Court has established the following four-part test to determine when the practical effect of a tax burden is
within commerce clause admonitions:" (1) There must be a substantial
nexus between the state and the activity taxed; (2) the tax must be fairly
apportioned; (3) the tax must not discriminate against interstate commerce; and (4) the tax must be fairly related to the services supplied by
the state. 46 Once a taxation scheme clears this four-part hurdle, its imposition will not be found unduly burdensome.
The test's first two requirements are also due process requirements.
Thus, proponents of the commerce clause challenge to apportionment
have focused on the third factor, asserting that the method discriminates
against interstate commerce.47 The thrust of this argument is that the
practical effect of apportionment subjects an interstate enterprise to the
risk of multiple taxation-a risk not shared by the intrastate business.4a
However, just as the possibility of income distortion is not violative of due
process, the fact that apportionment may result in double taxation-that
there is a risk it will occur-does not impose an undue burden on interstate commerce.4 9
Furthermore, the "risk" argument is flawed in that it is not the apportionment method itself that brings about the risk of duplicative taxa42. See generally cases cited supra note 2.
43. Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, 430 U.S. 274, 279, 288 (1977).
44. Department of Revenue of Wash. v. Association of Wash. Stevedoring Cos., 435 U.S.
734, 750 (1978); see also Complete Auto, 430 U.S. at 279, 279 n.8.
45. Complete Auto, 430 U.S. at 279.
46. Id.
47. See, eg., Complete Auto, 430 U.S. at 279-87; Mobil Oil Corp., 445 U.S. at 443.
48. Mobil Oil Corp., 445 U.S. at 443; see also Moorman Mfg. Co., 437 U.S. at 277.
49. See Moorman Mfg. Co., 437 U.S. at 278.
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tion. Rather, the risk is a function of the jurisdictions in which a unitary
business operates, and is present for two reasons. First, different jurisdictions may employ various methods for the division of income, including
varying themes of an apportionment formula." Second, in some instances one state may be entitled to tax the full value of income included
within another's apportionment formula. 1 Invalidation of the apportionment method would do little to eliminate the risk. Complete elimination could only be accomplished if the Court went beyond apportionment
invalidation and formulated uniform rules for the division of income. 2
Because the mere risk of multiple taxation is not constitutionally prohibited, the Court has refused to "establish a theoretical constitutional pref'53
erence for one method of taxation over another.
The Court has not been unaware that in some instances actual duplicative taxation may occur. Such an occurrence would then raise the
possibility of a constitutionally impermissible burden. 4 Nevertheless the
Court has not been persuaded of the need to cure what might be an actual burden by prohibiting a method of taxation that creates only the
potential for burden. Rather, the Court has preferred a case-by-case approach, continually emphasizing and relying on its ability to relieve a
particular taxpayer from an unfair burden and to provide a forum to
ensure that fair apportionment is accomplished.5 5
Under both the due process and commerce clause analyses, a state's
employment of the apportionment method does not, by itself, result in
the imposition of an unconstitutional tax. This conclusion hinges on the
Court's reasoning that although the use of the method presents a risk of
income distortion and double taxation, it is not the method itself but its
application to a particular taxpayer that may cause a constitutionally
prohibited harm. Since the Court can cure any actual harm that occurs,
50. Id. at 277-79. Apportionment operates on the theory that if all jurisdictions utilized it,
only 100% of the net income would be taxed. In reality, however, not all jurisdictions use
apportionment. Those that do use it do not necessarily apply the same formula. For example,
some jurisdictions may use a three-factor formula while others apportion based on a single
factor.
51. See, e.g., Mobil Oil Corp., 445 U.S. at 444. In Mobil Oil Corp., Vermont had included
dividend income received by Mobil from its subsidiaries and affiliates. Because New York was
the state of commercial domicile, it had the power, although it had chosen not to exercise it, to
tax such income in full without apportionment.
52. Moorman Mfg. Co., 437 U.S. at 278.
53. Mobil Oil Corp., 445 U.S. at 444-45.
54. Id.; see also JapanLine, 441 U.S. at 447. But see ContainerCorp., 463 U.S. 159, where

actual double taxation of 14% was not enough to find an impermissible burden. The result in
Container Corp. returns to the same question raised under due process-how much is too
much?
55. Japan Line, 441 U.S. at 447; see also Mobil Oil Corp., 445 U.S. at 443-46.
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the Court's constitutional mandate, if any, is not the prohibition of the
method but the monitoring of its application.
While this rationale carries much weight in the domestic sphere, the
Court has recognized that other factors are present when foreign commerce becomes entangled in the scheme, especially because the Court's
ability to intervene effectively is substantially limited. 6 This realization,
however, has not led the Court to conclude that the use of the apportionment method constitutes a per se impermissible burden on foreign commerce. Rather, the Court has developed an additional analysis to be used
when foreign-source income is involved.57 This additional analysis becomes important where foreign parent corporations become part of the
unitary approach.5
I.

FOREIGN COMMERCE-THE STANDARD OF
"CLOSER SCRUTINY"

When a state taxation scheme seeks to include foreign-source income, a stricter constitutional inquiry, in addition to the traditional fourpart commerce clause analysis already imposed by the Court, is required. 9 To understand how this inquiry affects the treatment of foreign
parent corporations, the requirements of that standard and the rationale
behind it must first be examined.
A.

The Development of the Standard

The requirement of a stricter constitutional inquiry was first enunciated in JapanLine, Ltd. v. County of Los Angeles.6" In that case, California sought to apply an ad valorem property tax to cargo containers
owned by six Japanese shipping companies. The companies were domiciled in Japan and had their principal place of business there. The containers were housed in Japan and were used exclusively in the
transportation of cargo in foreign commerce. In their international journeys, the containers passed through California. Although they did not
remain in California permanently, some stayed in California ports for up
to three weeks in any given year. It was based on this average presence
within the state that California sought to levy its tax.6 1
The Court acknowledged that, as applied to Japan Line's activities,
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.

Japan Line, 441 U.S. at 447-48.
Id. at 446.
See infra text accompanying notes 93-98.
Japan Line, 441 U.S. at 446.
441 U.S. 434 (1979).
Id. at 445.
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the California tax satisfied the four-part commerce clause analysis.6 2
However, the Court rejected the state's argument that an identical analysis is applicable whether a tax is levied against interstate or foreign commerce.6 3 In striking down the tax, the Court stated that a burden on
foreign commerce requires "a more extensive constitutional inquiry. . . . ,. Once the traditional four-part test is satisfied, two additional considerations must be analyzed to determine whether the tax
imposes an impermissible burden on foreign commerce:65 "first, whether
the tax, notwithstanding apportionment, creates a substantial risk of international multiple taxation, and, second, whether the tax prevents the
Federal Government from 'speaking with one voice when regulating
commercial relations with foreign governments.' "66
The first factor enunciated by the Court seems to demonstrate, at
least on its face, a significant departure from the interstate commerce
clause position. In the interstate setting, the Court had always recognized a risk of multiple taxation through various methods for the division
of income, the variations on the theme of a particular method, or one
jurisdiction's power to tax in full a given item of income. Nonetheless,
the Court steadfastly had refused to take this risk into account when
analyzing the constitutionality of a state taxation scheme. Instead, its
focus had been on whether actual harm occurred due to the application
of the taxation method to a particular taxpayer.
In Japan Line, however, the Court appeared to be taking a different
approach, by announcing that additional scrutiny entailed looking at the
risk created by the imposition of a tax which is fairly apportioned. As
enunciated by the Court, fair apportionment may not be enough to prevent an impermissible burden in the international arena.6 7
The fair apportionment principle, as applied to interstate commerce,
is based on the premise that no jurisdiction will tax the full value of the
instrumentalities of interstate commerce, but rather that each jurisdiction will only tax its proportionate share.6 If one jurisdiction does seek
to tax in full, or taxes more than its appropriate share, resulting in the
imposition of multiple tax burdens, the Court can intervene and provide
the appropriate remedy.6 9 When a court can effectively step in, the risk
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.

Id.
Id. at 446.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 451.
Id.
Id. at 447.
Id. at 446-47.
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of multiple taxation need not be taken into account, because "the fact of
apportionment [under this reasoning] means that 'multiple burdens logically cannot occur.' "70 In the international realm, however, an adequate
remedy to multiple taxation may not be available where one party is a
foreign nation and there is no single authoritative tribunal to enforce full
apportionment by all jurisdictions seeking to tax. 7
This problem was illustrated in Japan Line. The containers were
subject to and assessed a full value property tax within their home port.7"
The California tax not only presented the risk of duplicative taxation, but
also subjected the Japanese corporation to actual multiple tax burdens in
spite of its being an otherwise fair apportionment.73
The second factor, "whether the tax prevents the Federal Government from speaking with one voice," stems from the paramount power of
Congress to regulate commerce with foreign nations. A state action impinging on this power cannot be upheld under the commerce clause.7 4
The second consideration set forth by Japan Line is thus an analysis of
whether a state taxation scheme does indeed inhibit congressional power
to regulate foreign commerce by interfering with delicate international
relations and impeding foreign trade. 75 The mere fact that a state tax is
imposed on an instrumentality of foreign commerce does not necessarily
result in a forbidden interference. Rather, the Court indicated that the
tax would have to be one that could cause (1)international disputes, (2)
retaliation against United States-owned instrumentalities such that the
nation as a whole would be adversely affected, or (3) interference with
national policy, 76 thus preventing the nation from speaking with one
voice.7 7
In JapanLine, the United States and Japan had entered into a treaty
which dispensed with the assessment of taxes on temporarily imported
containers. The California tax, therefore, was in opposition to stated national policy. Furthermore, since United States-owned containers temporarily located in Japan were not assessed a tax by that country, the
70. Id. at 447 (quoting Department of Revenue of Wash. v. Association of Wash. Stevedoring Cos., 435 U.S. 734, 746-47).
71. Id. at 447-48.
72. Id. at 452.
73. Id. at 452. Cf Mobil Oil Corp., 445 U.S. 425 (where actual duplication taxation did
not occur because the home state had not exercised its taxing authority).
74. Japan Line, 441 U.S. at 453-54.
75. Id. at 448-49.
76. Id. at 450. Whether the Court would have reached the same result had Japan chosen
not to exercise its own taxing power is open to question. In that situation the Court again
would have been dealing in potentialities versus actualities.
77. Id. at 450-51.

Hastings Int'l and Comparative Law Review

[Vol. 9

potential existed for economic retaliation and injured foreign trade
relations.7 8
B.

Refinement of the Standard

Although Japan Line involved a property tax in which one jurisdiction had the power to tax in full, it soon became apparent that the same
analysis would apply to the use of an apportionment method of income
division.
Japan Line seemed to enunciate a more exacting test in the area of
foreign commerce than existed in the interstate arena, but it left many
uncertainties as to how this test would be applied in the future. These
uncertainties arose because first, in Japan Line, actual duplicative taxation had occurred. Thus, no standard was set forth defining how "substantial" mere risk had to be before it exceeded constitutional
boundaries. Second, a treaty existed between the United States and Japan governing the taxation of containers. The California scheme undoubtedly interfered with stated foreign policy, leaving open the question
of whether an interference would be found absent an express federal
treaty.
In Container Corp. of America v. Franchise Tax Board,79 the Court
attempted to refine the standard by setting more concrete guidelines. In
the process, however, it appears to have returned to a more traditional
interstate commerce clause analysis. Container Corporation, a domestic
corporation with foreign subsidiaries, challenged the application of California's three-factor apportionment formula to its worldwide income.
Because foreign commerce was implicated, the Court acknowledged that
the applicable constitutional standard was that of closer scrutiny, as set
forth in Japan Line. 0 There were in fact several similarities between
Japan Line and Container Corp. including the following: (0)The actual
occurrence of double taxation, (2) the dissimilarity of the taxation
schemes of California and the foreign taxing authorities, (3) the consistency with international practice of the scheme utilized by the foreign
governments, and (4) the United States preference for the scheme utilized
by the foreign governments.8 1
These similarities, nevertheless, were not enough to strike down the
California scheme as applied to Container Corporation. In applying the
78.
79.
80.
81.

Id. at 453.
463 U.S. 159 (1980).
Id. at 185.
Id. at 187.
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substantial risk factor of the closer scrutiny test, the Court stated that
there is no absolute rule prohibiting state-induced double taxation. 82
This statement indicates that, despite the Court's language in JapanLine,
any risk, substantial or otherwise, is not enough to find an impermissible
burden on foreign commerce. From the language and result in Container
Corp., even actual double taxation does not appear to be sufficient. In
reaching its result, the Court explained that it is the context of the duplicative taxation and the alternatives available to the taxing state that must
be examined.8 3 The Court does not define exactly what context should
be examined. Cast in the guise of alternatives, the Court's additional
scrutiny sounds very much like the traditional analysis used when examining the apportionment method as applied to interstate commerce.
JapanLine involved containers subject to a full value tax in Japan,
meaning that any taxation scheme invoked by California inevitably
would result in double taxation. The alternative in that situation was
simple: do not allow the state to tax. The Court distinguished Container
Corp., noting that the duplicative taxation occurred, not because a particular method was used, but because California applied a different method
for the division of income from that employed by the foreign governments. The use of different methods can, as happened in Container
Corp., result in double taxation. However, with this type of double taxation, unlike that in Japan Line, the Court concluded that there was no
alternative to the taxing state, because even if the state applied the separate accounting method, variables in its application could also lead to
duplicative taxation.8" It would be patently unfair to mandate that the
state not tax the income of a corporation doing business within its borders.85 In fact, such a rule could even be violative of the tenth amendment.86 The state would have a strong argument that the impairment of
its right to tax income generated within its borders was an interference
with its sovereign functions. Thus, as it did in the interstate commerce
setting, the Court refused to rule that the Constitution prefers one
method of taxation over another when neither method inevitably results
in double taxation and both methods carry the risk of its occurrence.
Given this analysis, it becomes apparent that the context to which
82. Id. at 189.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 190-92.
85. Id. at 190.
86. "The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by
it to the states, are reserved to the states respectively, or to the people." U.S. CONST., amend.
X.
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the Court was referring could not have been a mere examination of
whether the state's chosen method, as opposed to another method, inevitably led to double taxation. If that was all the Court meant, the closer
scrutiny of Japan Lines has no effect at all in the foreign commerce setting. The result would be exactly the same as that reached by the interstate commerce analysis:8 7 the fact that a taxation method carries with it
the potential for multiple tax burdens does not render it constitutionally
void, and if two methods carry the same risk, one will not be favored
over the other.
Because of the overlap of analyses and the fact that actual double
taxation in Container Corp. was not enough to strike down the tax, a
strong argument can be made that the context to which the Court refers
is an examination of who bears the actual burden of the multiple taxthe foreign entity or the domestic corporation. The substantial risk cannot mean the risk that double taxation may occur through the use of
different methods or variables of the same method, but rather it must
mean the risk of adverse ramifications that actual duplicative taxation
may cause in the international setting. The risk is really defined by the
harm that may occur as a result of the imposition of multiple tax burdens. Justice Powell, in his dissenting opinion in ContainerCorp., argues
that there are two risks-one that occurs when a state applies a different
taxation method altogether and one that occurs through different applications of a uniform system.8 8 Accordingly, he states that although the
latter may result in double taxation, international negotiation is more
likely in a situation where the disagreement arises within a uniform system.89 Serious disagreement is also far more likely when the burden of
the duplicative tax falls on the foreign entity. Thus, as a state moves
further from accepted international practice, and the likelihood that the
burden will fall on a foreign nation increases, the harm that may occur is
greater, and the risk is more substantial.
This interpretation of the context of double taxation is necessarily
bound up with the second prong of the closer scrutiny analysis-whether
the tax impairs federal uniformity, preventing the federal government
from speaking with one voice. 9° In addition to issues of whether a state
is preempted by express national policy on the subject, there is grave
concern for the implications of foreign policy and international relations
in general: foreign trade partners may find the taxation scheme of a par87.
88.
89.
90.

See generally supra note 2.
Container Corp., 463 U.S. at 201 (Powell J., dissenting).
Id.
Id. at 193.
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ticular state offensive, but their retaliation would be aimed at the United
States as a nation.9" In ContainerCorp., the Court noted that any offense
caused by the California scheme was "attenuated" at best because the tax
burden actually fell on the domestic corporation and not on the foreign
entity.9" If the tax were to be applied to a foreign parent corporation
with United States subsidiaries, the possibility of retaliation becomes less
attenuated, and the "risk" more substantial.
C.

The Application of Closer Scrutiny to the Foreign Parent
Corporation Context

Except for Japan Line, the unitary tax or apportionment tax cases
decided by the Court have involved domestic parent corporations challenging the inclusion of foreign subsidiary income.93 If, however, a state
were to take a unitary approach to foreign parent corporations with
United States subsidiaries, the Court might be forced to reach a different
conclusion.
At first glance, it appears that the closer scrutiny analysis would be
much the same as that in Container Corp. The same situation would
exist-double taxation could or would occur because the state and foreign taxing jurisdiction applied different methods for the division of income. As in ContainerCorp., the use of one method over another would
eliminate neither the double taxation nor the risk that it would occur.
The only alternative to double taxation would be for the state to refrain
from taxing the subsidiary doing business within its borders-a wholly
unsatisfactory result. Taking into account the context of double taxation
and examining the actual harm that may occur, there is a substantial risk
in this situation that arguably is not present when a domestic parent corporation is involved.
The first and foremost distinction is that in the foreign parent corporation context, the tax burden would fall on a foreign entity rather than a
domestic one. Although the potential for multiple taxation is the same in
both the United States and foreign parent situations, the offense felt by
the foreign nation in which a foreign parent is domiciled is suddenly
much less attenuated than in other contexts. The harm that may occur
to foreign relations becomes much less of a mere threat and more of a
91. Id. at 194. Such retaliation could take several forms including the cessation of foreign
investment in the United States. See generally ADVISORY COMMISSION, supra note 10 and
accompanying text.
92. Container Corp., 463 U.S. at 195.
93. Allen, The ContainerCorp. Case: The Unitary Tax Here and Abroad, 18 INT'L LAW.
127, 139 (1984).
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concrete reality. There is, therefore, a stronger argument that in this
context, multiple taxation carries with it a substantial risk to foreign relations, which would very likely mean that a state taxation scheme as applied to foreign parent corporations could not withstand closer scrutiny.
Whether, in recognition of this substantial risk, the Court could or
would fashion a remedy where there has been continued congressional
silence is questionable. In Container Corp. the Court emphasized that it
had little competence to determine when a foreign nation was offended,
how that nation would react, and how to balance the risk of retaliation
against the federal government's right to let the states decide how to
tax.

94

The Court would continue to face these problems in trying to resolve the foreign parent issue. Although the mere threat of harm becomes more of an actuality when the foreign nation itself is burdened,
there is still a question of how great the burden must be before imposition of multiple taxation becomes constitutionally impermissible. The
Court has little competence to determine whether all instances of multiple taxation would cause actual, rather than just threatened, harm. It is
doubtful that the Court would attempt to devise a "bright line" rule for
determining how much is too much in the international realm. This dilemma, coupled with the fact that it is Congress that is empowered to
regulate foreign commerce, makes it much more likely that the Court
would hold that the issue of how much burden is enough is nonjusticiable, thus leaving it to Congress to act. The language of ContainerCorp.95
leaves this possibility open to the Court, thus giving it an opportunity to
avoid confronting the inescapable conclusion that the apportionment
method cannot withstand additional scrutiny in the foreign parent
context.
Whether Congress should act is also open to debate. Although foreign nations have continuously voiced their objection to the unitary approach, no actual retaliation has occurred. 96 In fact, it appears that
natural competition for foreign business may cure the problem without
the need for a uniform policy of state taxation. This position was illustrated when Oregon repealed its unitary tax statute. 97 Several foreign
firms and plants made immediate plans to invest in that state rather than
94. Container Corp., 463 U.S. at 194.
95. Id.
96. See generally ADVISORY COMMISSION, supra note 10.
97. Why JapaneseFirms Boycott California, San Francisco Chron., Oct. 1, 1984, at 58,

col. 1.
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in nearby California, which continues to utilize the unitary approach.9"
Furthermore, in 1984, three leading Japanese firms announced that they
would not invest in any state imposing a unitary tax.9 9 Because states
want and need to attract foreign investors, the tactic being used by these
foreign investors would require a state seriously to question whether the
unitary approach for the taxation of multinational corporations is in the
state's best economic interest.
IV.

CONCLUSION

The unitary approach to state taxation raises serious questions involving the distortion of income attributable to the taxing jurisdiction
and the risk that multiple tax burdens will occur when the method is
used. Despite these problems, the Supreme Court has been unwilling to
declare the apportionment method unconstitutional. Rather, it has
looked at the application of the method in individual instances to determine if commerce clause and due process requirements have been met.
In the domestic setting this approach is linked to the Court's ability to
alleviate a specific taxpayer of the burden of any improper applications.
Although the Court has recognized that this same ability does not
exist in the international sphere, it still refuses to prohibit absolutely a
state from including foreign source income within the unitary scheme.
Instead, it has given the method closer scrutiny when foreign commerce
is involved, examining the context of any double taxation and the alternatives available to the taxing state. This approach worked well in both
JapanLine and ContainerCorp. In JapanLine, there was a simple alternative available that was not unfair to the state and undoubtedly satisfactory to the foreign entity. In ContainerCorp., the same alternative was
not feasible. In that case, however, unlike Japan Line, the context of the
double taxation was such that the threat of harm in the international
arena was not sufficiently great to justify invalidation of the state's chosen method. If, however, the court were faced with the application of a
unitary approach to a foreign parent corporation, the risk that potential
harm could occur in the area of foreign relations would be much higher if
multiple tax burdens were imposed. Because of this "substantial" risk
that actual harm would occur, the Court would have difficulty concluding that in this context the unitary approach could withstand closer scrutiny under the foreign commerce clause.
When analyzing the risk in this context, the Court would still face
98. Id.
99. Id.
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the problem of determining at exactly what point the harm would be
actualized and thus justify an impingement upon the state's right to tax
as it pleases. Since the Court has acknowledged that it does not have the
tools to make such a judgment, it is likely to declare the issue nonjusticiable, thus placing the problem in the lap of Congress, where, perhaps, it
belongs.
Whether Congress should act also depends on how substantial the
risk of harm is perceived to be. Foreign nations have complained loudly,
but have done little to retaliate against the nation as a whole. Rather,
they have found a way to retaliate against individual unitary tax states by
withdrawing their investment in those states. This strategy, along with
continued congressional silence leads to the conclusion that perhaps the
risk of harm to foreign relations is in fact lower than feared and easily
cured by the natural competition for foreign investment between the
states.

